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ABSTRACT 
Here we review evidence from cognitive neuroscience for a tight relation between language and 
action in the brain. We focus on two types of relation between language and action. First, we 
investigate whether the perception of speech and speech sounds leads to activation of parts of the 
cortical motor system also involved in speech production. Second, we evaluate whether 
understanding action-related language involves the activation of parts of the motor system. We 
conclude that whereas there is considerable evidence that understanding language can involve 
parts of our motor cortex, this relation is best thought of as inherently flexible. As we explain, the 
exact nature of the input as well as the intention with which language is perceived influences 
whether and how motor cortex plays a role in language processing.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Do we use the motor parts of our brain in understanding language? Given our everyday 
experience, a relation between these two domains of behavior may seem far-fetched at best. We 
typically do not have the impression that our motoric capabilities contribute to our understanding 
of the content of, say, a chapter in a scientific book (apart from that we need to move our eyes to 
be able to read these words). In this contribution we investigate evidence for a more profound 
relationship between language and action; one in which understanding language partially relies on 
using the cortical structures that we also use in ‘doing’, in action. In the remainder of this section 
we first introduce some theoretical background which underlies this idea. In sections 2 and 3 we 
turn to experimental evidence for two specific action-language relationships. In section 4 we 
discuss the relationship between language and action and provide some directions for future 
research. Section 5 summarizes the chapter.  
 
Embodied cognition 
The divide between cognition on the one hand and bodily action on the other has been central 
within cognitive science. Although several theorists have underlined the importance of action for 
cognition [1, 2], action and cognition have been studied mostly as separate domains. This can be 
regarded as a reflection of traditional ‘Cartesian’ or ‘orthodox’ cognitive science. Mind and body 
are fundamentally different entities in this framework although they closely interact with each 
other. This strong metaphysical divide has led to the common notion that cognition is separated 
from action [3-7]. Consequently, language—as a sub-domain of cognition— and action have also 
been traditionally studied as distinct faculties of the mind [8].  
From an embodied cognition viewpoint however, contrary to the classical Cartesian view, 
the importance of bodily processes for cognition is central. Cognition is thought of as ‘grounded’ 
in and therefore inseparable of bodily action [4, 5, 7, 9-13]. The representation of a concept is for 
instance proposed to be crucially dependent upon perceptual-motor processes that relate to that 
concept [14]. This stands in contrast to a more traditional, ‘cognitivist’ stance in which a 
concept’s meaning is considered to be an amodal symbolic representation [15].  
Embodied cognition comes in very different degrees, from only slightly modifying the 
traditional Cartesian view to more radical claims about, for instance, the extension of the human 
mind into the environment[16]. These more and less radical proposals have in common that they 
stress the importance of connections between bodily actions and cognition or more specifically, 
action and language. This interrelatedness should ultimately be reflected in overlap of brain 
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processes supporting language and action. In the following sections we describe experimental 
evidence for two kinds of action-language relations. 
 
Structure of the chapter 
We have structured this review according to two different combinations of language and action 
that have been studied by cognitive neuroscience. First, we look at studies investigating the 
neural representations of speech sounds during comprehension. Some proposals argue that the 
neural representation of a speech sound during comprehension may involve structures in the 
motor cortex used in pronouncing a speech sound. This is a clear example in which researchers 
have looked for a neural link between language (speech sound) and action (motor cortex 
representation of the speech sound). Second, we review studies on the neural representation of 
action-related language. Here, the assertion is that the meaning of for instance an action verb is at 
least partially represented in the cortical motor system. In other words, to understand action-
related language, activations in the motor system are crucial. The idea of a linguistic entity (e.g. 
action word) as being represented in the neural motor system is comparable to that for speech 
sounds, however now at a semantic level. A neural link between language and action would be 
shown in this case if indeed the perception of action verbs leads to activation of parts of the 
action network in the brain.  
 
Some notes on methods 
In this chapter we take a cognitive neuroscience perspective on the question of how action and 
language may be related. We discuss findings from measurements in the healthy human brain. 
The measurement that we describe are done using several neuroimaging methods. One set 
employs indirect measures of neural activity, such as increased blood oxygenation levels, to 
investigate which brain regions are activated in a given task. Examples are functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET). Another set of methods 
measure electrical or magnetic fields generated by large groups of neurons. These signals are 
measured at the scalp using Electroencephalography (EEG) or Magnetoencephalography (MEG). 
By time-locking and averaging the EEG/MEG signal to a number of stimuli representing a given 
cognitive event (e.g. reading of a word), event related potentials / fields (ERPs from EEG, ERFs 
from MEG) are generated. Another technique that we will refer to is transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), in which a magnetic field is exerted onto a relatively focal part of the cortex. 
This technique is most well-known as a ‘virtual lesioning’ technique, in which part of the cortex 
is temporarily (and reversibly) ‘knocked out’. This technique is mainly used to establish whether 
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the stimulated area is causally involved in the process under study. Another way of employing 
TMS is to measure the motor evoked potential (MEP) in a muscle, while stimulating the motor 
cortex by a TMS pulse. The pulse will evoke an MEP when the subject is at rest. The rationale of 
this approach is that if motor cortex is involved in reaction to a given stimulus, an increased 
excitability of the motor cortex will lead to an increased MEP as compared to reaction of a 
stimulus which does not excite the motor cortex. 
Examples of studies employing these techniques will clarify their potential for the 
questions under study. For now it suffices to say that fMRI and PET are techniques with a 
moderately good spatial resolution (measuring from ‘voxels’, small cubes of brain tissue, of 
typically 3x3x3 mm), but with poor temporal resolution (in the order of several seconds). On the 
contrary, EEG/MEG has superior temporal resolution (in the order of milliseconds), but less 
accurate spatial resolution. The strongest point of TMS is that is has the potential to determine 
whether a cortical area is causally involved in a given process, whereas fMRI and PET are 
correlational techniques. 
 
MOTOR REPRESENTATIONS OF SPEECH SOUNDS  
Motor theory of speech 
A first area in which the connection between language and action has been made is that of 
speech perception. Especially the motor theory of speech perception[17] has made strong claims 
about this connection. This theory posits that perceived speech sounds are directly mapped onto 
the motor representations of the articulatory gestures that would be necessary to produce these 
speech sounds. For example, upon hearing the word ‘ball’ the incoming sounds are mapped onto 
the stored motor representations that are recruited when pronouncing the word ‘ball’. Crucially, 
in this theory, speech perception takes place by directly mapping the speech input onto a motor 
representation. In this way, the activation of motor representations is what constitutes speech 
perception. In the light of the recent findings of mirror neurons in motor areas[18, 19] this theory 
has gained renewed popularity. The prediction that has been tested mostly is that perceiving a 
speech sound should activate the same motor representation in the brain as producing that speech 
sound. Note that this is a far less radical claim than proposed by the motor theory of speech 
perception. After all, activation of similar motor areas does not implicate that these are crucial 
for speech perception. We will get back to this after reviewing the studies on this topic.  
 
Experimental evidence  
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Several neuroimaging studies have provided evidence for the hypothesis that perceiving a speech 
sound activates similar brain regions as producing that speech sound. In an fMRI experiment 
[20] subjects listen to meaningless syllables (e.g. /pa/) and subsequently pronounce the same 
syllables. They report overlapping activations during perception and production in bilateral 
precentral gyri and central sulci (premotor and primary motor cortex). Activation in these areas 
was significantly higher to the perception of the syllables than to non-speech sounds (e.g. the 
sound of a bell). In a related experiment, it was found that producing syllables which start with 
phonemes that involve movement of the lips or of the tongue ([p] and [t], respectively) activated 
the same portions of precentral cortex as listening to these syllables [21]. Moreover, these 
regions overlapped with those activated when subjects simply moved their tongue or lips, that is, 
without speech production. Note that the cortical motor system at this level has a somatotopic 
organization, such that distinct parts command different effectors in a structured manner. 
Pulvermuller et al. showed that when listening to or pronouncing syllables related to lip or 
tongue movements, the same organization is preserved. In other words, parts of premotor cortex 
that become activated when moving the lips or tongue also become activated when listening to 
speech sounds that involve movement of the lips or tongue. In an interesting variant of this line 
of research, English speaking subjects were presented with native (English) and non-native 
phonemes [22]. The non-native phonemes were rated to be hard to pronounce by native speakers 
of English. The assumption of this study was that no motor representations would exist for the 
non-native phonemes, since they are not produced by speakers of English. Activity in superior 
temporal areas was negatively correlated with the producibility of a phoneme. That is, the harder 
a phoneme was to produce for the English speakers, the more superior temporal areas were 
activated. Premotor cortex also distinguished between native and non-native phonemes, in the 
sense that activation was higher for nonnative than for native phonemes. The authors argued that 
since a match between stored and perceived speech sounds is impossible, hearing a non-native 
speech sound led to an activation increase. These data neither support an exclusively sensory 
(reflected in superior temporal activation) nor motor (reflected in premotor activation) account of 
speech perception. Overall, these fMRI studies suggest that merely listening to speech sounds 
activates parts of the neural motor system. Moreover, this activation seems to be rather specific 
in the sense that listening to speech sounds which involve movement of the lips also leads to 
activation of part of the motor cortex involved in actually moving the lips.  
 Another way of assessing whether motor cortex is activated during speech perception is 
to use TMS to measure the excitability of the motor cortex while subjects perceive speech.  
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Fadiga and colleagues measured MEPs of tongue muscles while stimulating the part of the motor 
cortex that leads to movement of the tongue [23]. Subjects listened to Italian words containing 
phonemes that in production lead to strong movement of the tongue (e.g. ‘birra’) or to words that 
induce less tongue movement (e.g. ‘baffo’). If listening to words evokes specific activation of the 
motor system, greater tongue muscle activation is expected to ‘tongue words’ than to ‘non-
tongue words’. Indeed, stronger MEPs were found when subjects listened to the ‘tongue words’ 
compared to when subjects listened to the ‘non-tongue words’. Interestingly, this effect was also 
present with non-words with similar acoustic characteristics as the real words. However, in the 
non-words the MEP levels were smaller overall, which suggests a lexical influence on the motor 
representation of speech sounds.  
 Instead of looking at tongue muscles, in a related experiment the activity of lip muscles 
was measured [24]. Increased MEPs of lip muscles were found in response to stimulation of the 
mouth representation in motor cortex while subjects listened to continuous prose. Hand muscles 
were recorded as a control condition while the cortical hand area was stimulated. No modulation 
of hand muscles was found. In contrast to this latter finding, [25] found facilitation of hand 
muscles to stimulation of hand motor cortex during speech perception. No such facilitation was 
found during a nonlinguistic memory task. This finding was explained in the context of an 
evolutionary scenario in which language is thought to have evolved out of manual 
communication. It is unclear why these authors do find modulation of hand muscles, and others 
[24] did not. In [26]  activation across the whole brain using PET as well as MEPs of mouth 
muscles were measured after stimulation with TMS. Activity in an area in the left inferior frontal 
cortex (‘Broca’s area’) was correlated with the facilitation of the mouth muscle. The authors 
argue for Broca’s area as ‘priming’ the motor system in response to speech perception. Most 
TMS studies complement evidence from fMRI studies that found activation of parts of the motor 
cortex in listening to speech sounds [but see 27]. Facilitatory effects are reported for tongue, lip 
as well as hand muscles, depending upon the specifics of the experiment. The activation of motor 
cortex is reasonably fast, such that a TMS pulse given 100 ms after onset of a critical speech 
sound leads to a facilitation of the muscle involved in its production [23].  
 In another line of work, TMS was used to temporarily interfere with processing in motor-
related areas. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) allows one to briefly and temporarily 
interfere with processing in a relatively focal part of cortex. This technique was used to assess 
whether motor resonance in reaction to listening to speech sounds is effector-specific. 
Participants listened to ‘lip-related’ and ‘tongue-related’ phonemes (e.g. [b] and [p]) and 
performed a categorization task while parts of primary motor cortex involved in moving the 
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tongue, or part of primary motor cortex involved in moving the lips, was stimulated. Stimulation 
occurred briefly (50 ms) before onset of the phoneme and led to a speeded response in the case 
of a ‘matching’ phoneme and to a slower response in the case of a discordant phoneme [28]. That 
is, if the lip-related area of M1 was stimulated before hearing the ‘lip-related’ phoneme ‘[b]’, 
participants were faster to categorize the phoneme, whereas they were slower to categorize the 
‘tongue-related’ phoneme ‘[d]’ (and vice versa). The authors concluded that motor cortex seems 
to be causally (and not ‘just’ correlationally) related to perception of speech sounds.  
 A similar line of argument was used in a study in which slow repetitive TMS was used to 
temporarily ‘lesion’ parts of premotor cortex [29]. It was shown that participants were selectively 
impaired on phoneme discrimination after such stimulation over left premotor cortex, but not 
after stimulation over superior temporal areas. Interestingly, the reversed pattern was observed 




In sum, fMRI and TMS studies indicate that representations of speech sounds in (pre)motor 
cortex that are activated during speaking, are also activated while listening to speech sounds. 
Although it might be tempting to interpret this in terms of the motor theory of speech perception, 
note that the studies reviewed here do not provide unequivocal evidence that motor activation is 
necessary in understanding language, as was argued by the motor theory of speech perception 
[30]. The finding of a lexical modulation of MEPs to words versus non-words with the same 
acoustic properties [23] for instance shows that speech sounds are not invariantly mapped onto 
motor representations, but are modulated by higher level processes [see also 22]. Moreover, 
temporal ‘lesioning’ with TMS impairs phoneme categorization / discrimination, but does not 
render it impossible [28, 29]. Although these studies cannot prove the motor theory of speech 
perception [31], they do provide evidence for a link between language and action in the brain. 
After all, it is consistently reported that merely listening to speech or speech sounds activates 
part of the motor system involved in producing speech sounds.  
 
ACTION SEMANTICS  
So far, we have discussed a connection between language and action that is restricted to a form 
level without the requirement of access to the semantics of words. This is different for action-
related language. The question here is: Do words describing actions activate parts of the brain 
involved in sensorimotor processes, such as premotor cortex? If so, this would provide evidence 
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for a link between language and action in the brain because the assertion would be that parts of 
the brain that are activated when performing or observing an action are also activated when 
comprehending language describing that action. We will first look at studies presenting single 
action verbs. Later we look at studies presenting participants with sentences describing actions, 
either in literal or in a metaphorical sense. 
 
Reading verbs 
Hauk and colleagues [32] took advantage of the somatotopic organization of the motor cortex to 
investigate the representation of action verbs. Subjects read verbs describing actions performed 
with the feet, hands or face (e.g. ‘kick’, ‘pick’, ‘lick’). Subsequently, they performed simple 
actions with foot, finger or tongue, which activated primary and premotor cortex in a 
somatotopic fashion, as expected. Interestingly, reading action verbs led to a similar somatotopic 
pattern of activation. Overlap between parts of (pre)motor cortex activated by action verbs and 
by action production was clearly observed for two of the three effectors. Converging evidence 
for the involvement of motor areas in processing action words comes from a recent PET study, 
which reports increased activation in left precentral and central sulcus (i.e. premotor and primary 
motor cortex) when comparing motor words (both nouns and verbs) to sensory words (also both 
nouns and verbs) [33]. Kemmerer and colleagues replicated the somatotopic activation in 
premotor cortex and additionally showed that different verb types which share the semantic 
feature ‘ACTION’ all activate premotor structures [34]. On the contrary, the semantic feature 
‘MOTION’ consistently activated more posterior areas known to be involved in movement 
processing [see 35 for discussion].  
 Willems, Hagoort and Casasanto investigated whether the premotor cortex activation in 
response to action verbs is body-specific, meaning that it could be different for individuals with a 
different preference to perform hand actions. They measured brain activation (with fMRI) in 
healthy left- and right-handed participants who engaged in a simple lexical decision task [36]. 
Participants read words strongly related to hand actions and action verbs less strongly related to 
hand actions. A different lateralization pattern in reaction to the reading of hand action verbs was 
observed in left- and right-handers: left-handers activated their right premotor cortex more 
strongly and right-handers activated left premotor cortex more strongly. This is to be expected if 
semantic activation in reaction to the reading of action verbs involves creating a body-specific 
representation. After all, the left hand is mainly controlled by the right motor cortex and vice 
versa. Since left-handers prefer to act out the action that the verbs referred to with their left hand, 
they activated right premotor cortex more strongly, and the reverse was true for right-handers. 
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 Together, these studies provide evidence for the activation of premotor cortex in response 
to action words. Moreover, it shows that this activation is rather specific in the sense that action 
verbs performed with a certain effector elicit activation in the area that is also activated when 
using that effector. A possible criticism is, however, that the activations in motor cortex may be 
the by-product of imagery of an action. This would mean that the premotor activations are not 
part of the representation of the action verb, but rather emerge only after the action concept is 
identified. In our own work, we tried to account for this by asking participants to actually 
imagine performing the actions described by the action verbs. That is, the same participants were 
scanned twice: the first time they performed lexical decision task on visually presented action 
verbs, the second time they imagined themselves performing these actions [36, 37]. Our results 
show that both reading for lexical decision as well as explicit motor imagery evoked effector-
specific activations in premotor cortex. However, these activations were not overlapping, which 
argues against an interpretation of the activations observed during reading as reflecting motor 
imagery. We will get back to this finding in the discussion section. 
 Studies using TMS and EEG/MEG have additionally been used to argue against an 
imagery-related interpretation of motor cortex involvement during reading of verbs. For instance, 
Some have argued against an explanation of their results in terms of mental imagery [38]. In a 
TMS study hand/arm and leg words were presented while stimulating the ‘hand/arm’ and ‘leg 
area’ of the motor cortex [38]. Subjects’ task was to make a lexical decision to the visually 
presented words. Faster reaction times were observed to hand/arm words after stimulation of the 
‘hand/arm area’ as well as to leg words after stimulation of the ‘leg area’. This was taken as 
evidence that the (pre)motor activation is a crucial part of the action verb’s semantic 
representation, because stimulating the motor cortex speeded up lexical decision. In related MEG 
and EEG studies it was found that differences between leg, arm or face words emerge around 
200 ms [39, 40]. Again, the localizations of these effects showed a dissociation between leg 
words in dorsal premotor cortex and arm and face words in more ventral premotor regions. The 
authors argue that the latency of this effect is too fast to be explainable in terms of general 
strategic effects such as imagery.  
 A related but partly different result than that of premotor cortex activation to action 
words was obtained in two fMRI studies [41, 42]. Neural activity in these studies was compared 
while subjects performed a semantic matching task on triads of pictures or words describing 
actions or objects. Subjects’ task was to indicate which two objects or actions were semantically 
related to each other. In one of these studies increased activity to action words was observed in 
the motor cortex just as in the studies described above [41]. However, additionally, increased 
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activation was found in the vicinity of human motion area MT/MST [41, 42], when subjects had 
to judge actions compared to when they had to judge objects. That is, the judging of actions 
evoked activity in areas implicated in the processing of motion which is implicated by actions 
but not by the observation of objects.  
 Two other studies in part confirmed the findings of activation of (pre)motor cortex to 
action words. Noppeney and colleagues [43] report increased activation of left posterior temporal 
and anterior intraparietal areas in reaction to action words compared to abstract words. Only at a 
lower, uncorrected statistical threshold did they observe ventral premotor cortex activation. 
Ruschemeyer and colleagues compared activations to action verbs with ‘complex verbs’ that had 
the action verb as its stem, but did not have an action-related meaning [44]. For example the 
German verb ‘greifen’ (to grasp) was compared to ‘begreifen’ (to understand). The rationale was 
that if action verbs automatically activate parts of the motor cortex, this should also be the case 
in complex verbs that include an action verb, such as ‘begreifen’. Action verbs did activate 
premotor areas compared to abstract verbs. No such activation was however found in response to 
the complex verbs (i.e. verbs with an action stem but a non-action meaning). The conclusions to 
be drawn from this study however crucially depend on whether one believes that complex verbs 
such as ‘begreifen’ are stored with ‘greifen’ (‘to grasp’) as their stem.  
 
Comprehending sentences 
An approach related to the study of action words has been taken by a few studies comparing 
sentences describing actions to sentences describing abstract events. One fMRI study presented 
subjects with spoken sentences like ‘I bite an apple’ and ‘I appreciate sincerity’ [45]. The action 
sentences could be of three types: describing mouth actions (‘I bite an apple’), hand actions (‘I 
grasp the knife’) or leg actions (‘I kick the ball’). All action sentences activated left inferior 
frontal cortex more strongly than abstract sentences did. Moreover, sentences describing actions 
with different effectors activated the premotor cortex in a somatotopic manner. This result is 
comparable to that of action verbs which lead to premotor cortex activation in a somatotopic 
manner [32].  
A TMS study measured MEPs from hand and foot muscles while subjects listened to 
hand and foot related action sentences or to abstract sentences [46]. Stimulation of hand and foot 
areas in motor cortex led to decreased MEP amplitudes during perception of sentences related to 
the same effector; that is, for instance, stimulation of the hand area led to a decreased MEP in the 
hand muscle when subjects listened to a sentence implying an action done with the hand 
compared to a sentence describing an action done with the foot. Note that this is an opposite 
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finding from other TMS studies with a similar design that generally report increases in MEP 
amplitudes, which is then interpreted as reflecting increased facilitation of the motor cortex. 
Buccino and colleagues related their opposite findings to the non-specificity of spoken language 
as compared to the observation of real, visual action. However, this does not explain the reversal 
of the effect compared to other studies using action words.  
The results of study by Boulenger and colleagues [47] might shed light on the conflicting 
findings of Buccino et al [46]. That is, Boulenger and colleagues measured arm movement 
kinematics of a grasping action that could either start slightly before the presentation of an action 
verb or after the presentation of an action verb. This manipulation resulted in a complete reversal 
of findings: when the word was processed before the onset of the action, grasping was facilitated. 
That is, the action was performed faster when preceded by an action verb than when preceded by 
a concrete noun (the control condition). However, when the action verb was read when the action 
had already started, the action was performed more slowly compared to the presentation of a 
concrete noun, indicating interference. As the authors note, this may explain why some TMS 
studies find an increase in MEPs (indicating facilitation), whereas others find a decrease in 
MEPs (indicating interference). Indeed, TMS pulses in Buccino et al. were delivered during the 
reading of an action verb, whereas they were applied shortly after the verb in other TMS studies 
[e.g. 38]. Future studies should systematically investigate the order of information flow in these 
different cases.  
A TMS study showed that also abstract sentences invoke motor cortex activation [48]. 
Participants were presented with spoken sentences that described transfer (movement) of a 
concrete object, as in ‘Andrea carries the pizza to you’ or sentences describing the transfer of an 
abstract object, such as ‘Arthur presents the argument to you’. It was hypothesized that the 
abstract sentences would be understood by activating the same transfer schema that is also used 
to comprehend literal transfer. Control sentences described events without the involvement of 
transfer (e.g. ‘You smell the pizza with Andrea’). The main finding was an increase of MEPs to 
transfer sentences compared to non-transfer sentences. Moreover, there was no difference 
between concrete transfer sentences and abstract transfer sentences. This study suggests that not 
only concrete language describing an action activates part of the motor cortex, but that this also 
holds for abstract ‘transfer sentences’. 
 It has been found that action sentences activated premotor areas in a specific manner 
corresponding to whether sentences described an action done with the foot, hand or mouth [49]. 
Moreover, the activation to a sentence type (i.e. foot, hand or mouth) was strongest in the area 
that was activated when the subject watched videos of that same type of action (actions 
 13 
performed with the foot, hand or mouth). Interestingly, this effect was not present when stimuli 
consisted of metaphors in which action verbs were used, such as ‘He was chewing on the 
problem’. If one envisions (pre)motor cortex activation upon reading of an action verb to be 
automatic [14, 50], it may be predicted that even when the action verb is used metaphorically, it 
will activate parts of premotor cortex. Few studies have looked into this and the evidence is 
mixed. Aziz-Zadeh et al. [51] and Raposo et al. [52] did not find sensitivity of premotor areas to 
metaphorically used action sentences, whereas Boulenger and colleagues claimed to find a 
somatotopic activation pattern in premotor cortex upon reading of sentences such as “He kicked 
the habit” [53]. The discrepancy between these studies could be due to subtle differences in 
sentence materials and probably also task factors (see below). A definite answer awaits future 
research, but these findings suggest that reading of metaphorical action-language does not 
necessarily or automatically evoke motor cortex activations [cf. 14, 50]. 
Some recent findings similarly question the robustness of motor involvement in reading 
of concrete action verbs. For instance, Postle and colleagues did not observe effector-specific 
action execution and action verb reading overlap in premotor cortex [54]. In addition, Sato and 
colleagues showed that interference due to repeated presentation of hand action verbs is highly 
task-dependent. That is, they only observed motor interference of button presses to hand action 
verbs when participants performed an explicit semantic judgment task in response to the action 
verbs, but not when they engaged in lexical decision [55].  
 
Section summary 
In short, there is a considerable amount of evidence for the claim that listening to action-related 
language can activate cortical motor areas. However, differences in materials and task setting 
influence whether motor cortex is activated in response to reading action-related language [54, 
55]. Hence it is unclear whether motor cortex activation is a necessary part of the semantic 
representation of an action verb. What the studies reviewed here show is that motor areas can be 
activated upon hearing or reading an action word. To find out if the motor cortex is necessary in 
action word understanding, it needs to be shown that ‘knocking out’ the motor cortex (e.g. by 
repetitive TMS) specifically hampers the understanding of action words. Another concern in 
most of these studies is the role of imagining what is being heard. Many results could reflect the 
contribution of motor imagery, since this is often not explicitly controlled for [but see 36, 37]. In 
addition, it is not always easy to evaluate the weight of the conclusions, since most studies in this 
field are conducted without an explicit theory of semantic representation in mind. As a 
consequence, the precise implications of (pre)motor cortex activation are often unclear. Despite 
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these concerns, it is fair to conclude that the studies reviewed above provide ample evidence for 
a link between language and action, insofar as that parts of motor cortex can be activated in 
response to action-related language.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter is concerned with the involvement of cortical motor areas in understanding 
language. We have seen that studies in cognitive neuroscience provide evidence for links 
between language and action in the brain. First, motor areas activated in speech production are 
also activated when listening to speech sounds. Second, there is evidence for the involvement of 
the motor system in understanding action-related language. In sum this can be taken as evidence 
in favor of an (embodied) approach to cognition in which language is thought to be grounded in 
bodily action. In the remainder of this section we set out to place these findings in a broader 
perspective of language understanding and to raise some issues we feel will be crucial for future 
research.  
 
Embodied language understanding? 
We started out our chapter with a description of embodied cognition, which forms the theoretical 
basis for the idea that language understanding may involve cortical motor contributions. The 
reviewed studies can be easily taken as evidence in favor of this position. However, as Mahon 
and Caramazza point out, the large majority of findings in this literature can also be explained 
from a disembodied perspective [56]. The argument goes like this: it is possible that cortical 
motor activation during for instance reading of action-related language arises because of 
spreading activation from abstract conceptual representations to sensory-motor representation. In 
their own words: “In the context of a disembodied theory of concept representation, those facts 
would indicate that activation cascades from disembodied concepts to the sensory and motor 
systems that interface with the conceptual system.” [56 , p. 60]. These remarks remind us that the 
embodied perspective is often underspecified. We do not see much sense in splitting hairs on 
what should be called ‘embodied’ or ‘disembodied’. The data that we reviewed provide a case 
for some involvement of the motor system in language processing. The remaining question is 
how this role can be best characterized. To put it more bluntly: what are sensory-motor parts of 
the brain doing during language understanding? We believe that a key answer lies in treating 




The flexibility of language understanding 
So far we have treated ‘language’ as a relatively unitary and stable phenomenon. For instance, we 
discussed reading action-related language as a single cognitive process. Here we want to argue 
that motor cortex activation to action semantics is flexible and depends upon the nature of the 
input as well as on the task at hand for the comprehender [see also 56, 57]. One could on the 
contrary argue that activation in the motor system to reading of the verb ‘throw’ is not influenced 
by the linguistic context in which it is encountered. Gallese and Lakoff describe this position in 
the context of literal versus idiomatic language: “A further prediction of our theory of concepts is 
that such results should be obtained in fMRI studies, not only with literal sentences, but also with 
the corresponding metaphorical sentences. Thus, the sentence ‘He grasped the idea’ should 
activate the sensory-motor grasping-related regions of the brain. Similarly, a metaphorical 
sentence like ‘They kicked him out of class’ should active the sensory-motor kicking-related 
regions of the brain.” [14, p. 472]. 
 As we have seen, there is some literature to indicate that this is not the case [49, 52], 
although others have claimed to find motor cortex activation to idiomatic sentences [53]. It may 
be that language comprehension is more flexible than Gallese and Lakoff describe, in the sense 
that reading of the verb ‘throw’ leads to motor cortex activation only when its meaning is to be 
understood as literal throwing. That is, motor cortex activation can be ‘overruled’ by the context 
the verb occurs in. This finding illustrates that the brain acts in a flexible manner. This flexibility 
predicts that if the context renders the action interpretation of the verb (which is probably its 
default meaning) as incorrect, the motor cortex part of the verb’s representation will wash out or 
will not be activated at all [see also 58]. This is in contrast to a notion in which motor cortex is a 
necessary part of an action verb’s semantics. For instance, Glenberg and colleagues write about 
‘‘. . .an action schema in anterior portions of premotor cortex [. . .] which becomes the meaning of 
the verb ‘‘to give’’’’ [48, p. 908, our emphasis]. We would rather argue that these anterior 
premotor structures can be part of the meaning of ‘to give’, but that they are not necessarily so. 
Depending upon the task at hand as well as on the input, motor cortex activation may or may not 
be observed. 
 
Level of detail 
Another issue relates to the level of detail of motor cortex activation during language 
understanding. We have seen evidence that upon reading the word ‘throw’, parts of the motor 
cortex involved in executing hand movements is activated. This activation is typically interpreted 
as some kind of covert simulation. However, what kind of ‘throwing’ is being simulated when we 
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read ‘to throw’? We can throw in a wide variety of ways: underhand, overhand, with two hands, 
upward, downward etc. Moreover, we can throw many different objects, which influences the 
way we throw. Throwing a bowling ball is rather different from throwing a basketball. Hence the 
question arises whether similar processes are going on upon reading of the verb ‘to throw’ or 
reading of the sentence ‘The bowler picks up the ball, concentrates for a moment, and throws a 
strike’. We conjecture that in the latter case the motor cortex activation is more specified, more 
precise, whereas it remains underspecified upon simple reading of the word ‘throw’. This could 
lead to qualitatively different effects, that is, different and/or more specific action plans being 
activated in the case of the sentence as compared to the single verb.  
 We similarly argue that the motor cortex activation observed during reading / listening to 
action-related language is different than when we explicitly imagine doing these actions. 
Imagining doing an action and reading of language describing that action has been hypothesized 
to be equal by some [14]. Here we predict that this crucially depends upon the language context 
and the intention with which the linguistic input is processed. For instance, motor cortex 
activation during reading ‘throw’ could be different than during imagining ‘throwing’, because in 
the latter case one has to imagine a specific kind of throwing. Some first evidence comes 
from recent finding in which we report non-overlapping effector-specific activations in 
premotor cortex for reading of actions verbs versus imagining performing these actions 
[36, 37]. However, future research is needed to get a better handle on this issue, for instance on 
the issue whether reading more detailed action language would change this pattern of results. 
 Our proposal is related to what Zwaan and colleagues have termed the ‘linguistic focus 
hypothesis’ [57, 59-62]. Their assertion is that the content of language which is covered by the 
attention of the reader or listener (which is within her ‘linguistic focus’) will lead to sensory-
motor resonance if that content refers to sensory-motor properties. They presented participants 
with sentences like ‘During the film, the light bulb burned out. He found a new light bulb which 
he screwed in rapidly’. The sentences were presented in parts and participants ‘scrolled’ to the 
next part of the sentence by rotating a knob clockwise or counter-clockwise. Through this 
manipulation, the actual movement of the participants could match or mismatch with the motion 
described in the sentence. It was found that a mismatch between actual movement direction and 
direction of movement implied by the sentence lead to longer reading times, both when 
participants encountered the actual verb (‘screwed’) and when participants encountered the 
adverb (‘rapidly’) [60]. Interestingly, the effect was only present for the verb (and not for the 
adverb) in sentences such as ‘During the film, the light bulb burned out. He found a new light 
bulb which he screwed in carefully’ [60]. The authors argue that ‘carefully’ does not put focus on 
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the action component of the action and hence that motor resonance ceases quickly [see also 62]. 
This is a nice example of how motor activation during language comprehension depends upon the 
specific content in which action semantics occurs. 
 
As a final note, we want to point out that although this chapter was focused on relation between 
language and action, it should be noted that an embodied or grounded semantics also entails 
grounding of concepts, in for instance, perceptual and emotional systems [e.g. 63]. This is a clear 
prediction from distributed semantics, of which the relation between action semantics and motor 
cortex should be regarded a specific instance. The focus of present literature as well as of this 
chapter could give rise to the impression that the language-action relationship is special, which 
we believe to be incorrect [see also 64].  
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the data reviewed in this chapter show that parts of the cortical motor system are 
activated during language understanding. One body of evidence suggests that perceived speech 
sounds activate specific parts of motor cortex also involved in speech production. The second 
line of work that we discussed shows that action-related language activates parts of the motor 
system involved in motor execution. Neuroscientific evidence in healthy volunteers shows that 
there is a strong and intimate link between language and action in the brain. However, it is 
unclear how far this relationship can be taken and whether motor cortex activation is crucial for 
understanding every instance of an action word, or whether for instance the broader language 
context can overrule this. Moreover, the level of detail at which motor representations are 
activated when reading action language is unclear. Future work should be devoted to 
investigating these issues.  
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